#set enum(numbering: "a)") = Logical axiom schemes $bold(L_1): B→(C →B)$ $bold(L_2): (B→(C →D))→((B→C)→( B→D))$ $bold(L_3): B∧C→B$ $bold(L_4): B∧C→C$ $bold(L_5): B→(C →B∧C)$ $bold(L_6): B→B∨C$ $bold(L_7): C →B∨C$ $bold(L_8): (B→D)→((C →D)→(B∨C →D))$ $bold(L_9): (B→C)→((B→¬C )→¬B)$ $bold(L_10): ¬B→( B→C)$ $bold(L_12): ∀x F (x)→F (t)$ (in particular, $∀x F (x)→F (x)$) $bold(L_13): F (t)→∃ x F( x)$ (in particular, $F (x)→∃ x F (x)$) $bold(L_14): ∀x(G →F (x))→(G→∀x F (x)) $ $bold(L_15): ∀x(F (x)→G)→(∃z(x+z+1=y).x F (x)→G)$ = Theorems $[L_1, L_2, #[MP]]$: + $((A→B)→(A→C))→(A→(B→C))$. Be careful when assuming hypotheses: assume (A→B)→(A→C), A, B – in this order, no other possibilities! + $(A→B)→((B→C)→(A→C))$. It's another version of the *Law of Syllogism* (by Aristotle), or the transitivity property of implication. + $(A→(B→C))→(B→(A→C))$. It's another version of the *Premise Permutation Law*. Explain the difference between this formula and Theorem 1.4.3(a): A→(B→C)├ B→(A→C). == Theorem 1.5.1 (Deduction Theorem 1 AKA DT1) If $T$ is a first order theory, and there is a proof of $[T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, dots, A_n, B├ C$, then there is a proof of $[L_1, L_2, T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, dots, A_n├ B→C$. == Theorem 1.5.2 (Deduction Theorem 2 AKA DT2) If there is a proof $[T, #[MP], #[Gen]]: A_1, A_2, dots, A_n, B├ C$, where, after B appears in the proof, Generalization is not applied to the variables that occur as free in $B$, then there is a proof of $[L_1, L_2, L_14, T, #[MP], #[Gen]]: A_1, A_2, dots, A_n├ B→C$. == Theorem 2.2.1. + (C-introduction): $[L_5, #[MP]]: A, B├ A∧B$; + (C-elimination): $[L_3, L_4, #[MP]]: A∧B ├ A, A∧B ├ B$. == Theorem 2.2.2. + $[L_1, L_2, L_5, #[MP]]: (A→(B→C)) ↔ ((A→B)→(A→C))$ (extension of the axiom L_2). + $[L_1-L_4, #[MP]]: (A→B)∧( B→C)→( A→C)$ (another form of the *Law of Syllogism*, or *transitivity property of implication*). == Theorem 2.2.3 (properties of the conjunction connective). $[L_1- L_5, #[MP]]$: + $A∧B↔B∧A$ . Conjunction is commutative. + $ A∧(B∧C)↔( A∧B)∧C$. Conjunction is associative. + $A∧A↔A$ . Conjunction is idempotent. == Theorem 2.2.4 (properties of the equivalence connective). $[L_1- L_5, #[MP]]$: + $A↔A$ (reflexivity), + $(A↔B)→(B↔A)$ (symmetry), + $(A↔B)→((B↔C) →((A↔C))$ (transitivity). == Theorem 2.3.1 + (D-introduction)$[L_6, L_7, #[MP]]: A├ A∨B; B├ A∨B$; + (D-elimination) If there is a proof $[T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, ..., A_n, B├ D$, and a proof $[T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, ..., A_n, C├ D$, then there is a proof $[T, L_1, L_2, L_8, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, dots, A_n, B∨C ├ D$. == Theorem 2.3.4. Conjunction is distributive to disjunction, and disjunction is distributive to conjunction: + $[L_1-L_8, #[MP]]: (A∧B)∨C ↔(A∨C)∧(B∨C)$; + $[L_1-L_8, #[MP]]: (A∨B)∧C ↔(A∧C)∨(B∧C)$ . == Theorem 2.3.2 a) $[ L_5, L_6-L_8, #[MP]]: A∨B↔B∨A$ . Disjunction is commutative. b) $[L_1, L_2, L_5, L_6-L_8, #[MP]]: A∨A↔A$ . Disjunction is idempotent. == Theorem 2.3.3. Disjunction is associative: $[L_1, L_2, L_5, L_6-L_8, #[MP]]: A∨(B∨C)↔( A∨B)∨C$. == Theorem 2.3.4. Conjunction is distributive to disjunction, and disjunction is distributive to conjunction: + $[L_1-L_8, #[MP]]: (A∧B)∨C ↔(A∨C)∧(B∨C)$ . + $[L_1-L_8, #[MP]]: (A∨B)∧C ↔(A∧C)∨(B∧C)$ . == Theorem 2.4.1. (N-elimination) If there is a proof $[T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, ..., A_n, B├ C$, and a proof $[T, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, ..., A_n, B├ ¬C$, then there is a proof $[T, L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: A_1, A_2, ..., A_n├ ¬B$. == Theorem 2.4.2. a) $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: A, ¬B├ ¬(A→B)$. What does it mean? b) $[L_1-L_4, L_9, #[MP]]: A∧¬B→¬( A→B)$. == Theorem 2.4.3. $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: (A→B)→(¬B→¬A)$. What does it mean? It's the so-called *Contraposition Law*. Note. The following rule form of Contraposition Law is called *Modus Tollens*: $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: A→B, ¬B├ ¬A, or, frac(A→B \; ¬B, ¬A)$ == Theorem 2.4.4. $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: A→¬¬A$. == Theorem 2.4.5. $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: ¬¬¬A↔¬A$. == Theorem 2.4.5. a) $[L_1, L_2, L_9, #[MP]]: ¬¬¬A↔¬A$. b) $[L_1, L_2, L_6, L_7, L_9, #[MP]]: ¬¬( A∨¬A)$. What does it mean? This is a “weak form” of the *Law of Excluded Middle* that can be proved constructively. The formula $¬¬( A∨¬A)$ can be proved in the constructive logic, but $A∨¬A$ can't – as we will see in Section 2.8. == Theorem 2.4.9. + $[L_1, L_2, L_8, L_9, #[MP]]: ¬A∨¬B→¬( A∧B)$ . It's the constructive half of the so-called *First de Morgan Law*. What does it mean? + $[L_1-L_9, #[MP]]: ¬(A∨B)↔¬A∧¬B$. It's the so-called *Second de Morgan Law*. == Theorem 2.5.1. + $[L_1, L_8, L_10, #[MP]]: ¬A∨B→( A→B)$. + $[L_1, L_2, L_6, #[MP]]: A∨B→(¬A→B) ├¬A→(A→B)$ . It means that the “natural” rule $A∨B ;¬ A ├ B$ implies $L_10$! == Theorem 2.5.2. $[L_1-L_10, #[MP]]$: + $(¬¬A→¬¬B)→¬¬(A→B)$. It's the converse of Theorem 2.4.7(b). Hence, $[L1-L10, #[MP]]:├ ¬¬(A→B)↔(¬¬A→¬¬B)$. + $¬¬A→(¬A→A)$. It's the converse of Theorem 2.4.6(a). Hence, [L1-L10, #[MP]]: $¬¬A↔(¬A→A)$. + $A∨¬ A→(¬¬A→A)$ . + $¬¬(¬¬A→A)$. What does it mean? It’s a “weak” form of the Double Negations Law – provable in constructive logic. == Theorem 2.6.1. (Double Negation Law) $[L_1, L_2, L_8, L_10, L_11, #[MP]]: ¬¬A → A$. Hence, $[L_1-L_11, #[MP]]: ¬¬A ↔ A$. == Theorem 2.6.2. $[L_8, L_11, #[MP]]: A→B, ¬A→B├ B$. Or, by Deduction Theorem 1, $[L_1, L_2, L_8, L_11, #[MP]]: (A→B)→((¬A→B)→B)$. == Theorem 2.6.3. $[L_1-L_11, #[MP]]: (¬B→¬A)→(A→B)$. Hence, $[L_1-L_11, #[MP]]: (A→B) ↔ (¬B→¬A)$. == Theorem 2.6.3. _(another one with the same number of because numbering error (it seems like it))_ $[L_1-L_9, L_11, #[MP]]: ˫ ¬(A∧B)→¬A∨¬B$ . Hence, $[L_1-L_9, L_11, MP]: ˫ ¬(A∧B)↔¬A∨¬B$ . == Theorem 2.6.4. $[L_1-L_8, L_11, MP]: (A→B)→¬ A∨B $. Hence, (I-elimination) $[L_1-L_11, #[MP]]: (A→B)↔¬ A∨B$. == Theorem 2.6.5. $[L_1-L_11, MP]: ¬(A→B)→A∧¬B $. == Theorem 2.7.1 (Glivenko's Theorem). $[L_1-L_11, #[MP]]:├ A$ if and only if $[L1-L10, #[MP]]:├ ¬¬A$. == Theorem 2.8.1. The axiom $L_9$: $(A→B)→((A→¬B)→¬A)$ can be proved in $[L_1, L_2, L_8, L_10, L_11, #[MP]]$. == Replacement Theorem 1 Let us consider three formulas: $B$, $B'$, $C$, where $B$ is a sub-formula of $C$, and $o(B)$ is a propositional occurrence of $B$ in $C$. Let us denote by $C'$ the formula obtained from $C$ by replacing $o(B)$ by $B'$. Then, in the minimal logic, $[L_1-L_9, #[MP]]: B↔B'├ C↔C'$. == Replacement Theorem 2 Let us consider three formulas: $B$, $B'$, $C$, where $B$ is a sub-formula of $C$, and $o(B)$ is any occurrence of $B$ in $C$. Let us denote by $C'$ the formula obtained from $C$ by replacing $o(B)$ by B'. Then, in the minimal logic, $[L_1-L_9, L_12-L_15, #[MP], #[Gen]]: B↔B'├ C↔C'$. == Theorem 3.1.1. $[L_1, L_2, L_12, L_13, #[MP]]: forall x B(x) arrow exists x B(x)$ . What does it mean? It prohibits "empty domains". Theorem 3.1.2. + [L1, L2, L12, L14, MP, Gen]: ∀x(B→C)→(∀x B→∀xC). + [L1, L2, L12-L15, MP, Gen]: ∀x(B→C)→(∃z(x+z+1=y).x B→∃z(x+z+1=y).xC). == Theorems 3.1.3. If F is any formula, then: + (U-introduction) [Gen]: F(x) ├∀x F(x) . + (U-elimination) [L12, MP, Gen]: ∀x F(x) ├F(x) . What does it mean? + (E-introduction) [L13, MP, Gen]: F(x) ├∃z(x+z+1=y).x F(x) . What does it mean? == Theorems 3.1.4. If F is any formula, and G is a formula that does not contain free occurrences of x, then: + (U2-introduction) [L14, MP, Gen] G →F (x) ├G →∀x F (x) . What does it mean? + (E2-introduction) [L15, MP, Gen]: F (x)→G ├∃z(x+z+1=y).x F (x)→G . What does it mean? == Theorem 3.1.5. + [L1, L2, L5, L12, L14, MP, Gen]: $forall x forall y B(x,y) ↔ forall y forall x B(x,y)$ + [L1, L2, L5, L13, L15, MP, Gen]: $exists x exists y B(x,y) ↔ exists y exists x B(x,y)$. + [L1, L2, L12-L15, MP, Gen]: $exists x forall y B(x,y) ↔ forall y exists x B(x,y)$. Theorem 3.1.6. If the formula B does not contain free occurrences of x, then [L1-L2, L12-L15, MP, Gen]: (∀x B)↔B;(∃z(x+z+1=y).x B)↔B , i.e., quantifiers ∀x ;∃z(x+z+1=y). x can be dropped or introduced as needed. Theorem 3.2.1. In the classical logic, [L1-L15, MP, Gen]: ¬ x¬B ∀ ↔ xB. == Theorem 3.3.1. + [L1-L5, L12, L14, MP, Gen]: ∀x(B∧C)↔∀x B∧∀xC . + [L1, L2, L6-L8, L12, L14, MP, Gen]: ├∀x B∨∀xC →∀x(B∨C) . The converse formula ∀x(B∨C)→∀x B∨∀xC cannot be true. Explain, why. == Theorem 3.3.2. a) [L1-L8, L12-L15, MP, Gen]: ∃z(x+z+1=y).x(B∨C)↔∃z(x+z+1=y). x B∨∃z(x+z+1=y).xC . b) [L1-L5, L13-L15, MP, Gen]: ∃z(x+z+1=y).x(B∧C)→∃z(x+z+1=y). x B∧∃z(x+z+1=y).xC . The converse implication ∃z(x+z+1=y).x B∧∃z(x+z+1=y). xC →∃z(x+z+1=y). x(B∧C) cannot be true. Explain, why. Exercise 3.3.3. a) Prove (a→) of Theorem 3.3.2. (Hint: start by assuming B∨C , apply D-elimination, etc., and finish by E2-introduction.) = Three-valued logic This is a general scheme (page 74) to define a three valued logic. For example, let us consider a kind of "three-valued logic", where 0 means "false", 1 – "unknown" (or NULL – in terms of SQL), and 2 means "true". Then it would be natural to define “truth values” of conjunction and disjunction as $A∧B=min ( A, B)$ ; $A∨B=max (A , B)$ . But how should we define “truth values” of implication and negation? #table( columns: 5, [$A$], [$B$], [$A∧B$], [$A∨B$], [$A→B$], [$0$], [$0$], [$0$], [$0$], [$i_1$], [$0$], [$1$], [$0$], [$1$], [$i_2$], [$0$], [$2$], [$0$], [$2$], [$i_3$], [$1$], [$0$], [$0$], [$1$], [$i_4$], [$1$], [$1$], [$1$], [$1$], [$i_5$], [$1$], [$2$], [$1$], [$2$], [$i_6$], [$2$], [$0$], [$0$], [$2$], [$i_7$], [$2$], [$1$], [$1$], [$2$], [$i_8$], [$2$], [$2$], [$2$], [$2$], [$i_9$], ) #table( columns: 2, [$A$], [¬$A$], [$0$], [$i_10$], [$1$], [$i_11$], [$2$], [$i_12$], ) = Model interpreation == Interpretation of a language === The language-specific part Let L be a predicate language containing: - (a possibly empty) set of object constants $c_1, dots, c_k, dots $; - (a possibly empty) set of function constants $f_1, dots, f_m, dots,$; - (a non empty) set of predicate constants $p_1, ..., p_n, ...$. An interpretation $J$ of the language $L$ consists of the following two entities (a set and a mapping): + A non-empty finite or infinite set DJ – the domain of interpretation (it will serve first of all as the range of object variables). (For infinite domains, set theory comes in here.) + A mapping intJ that assigns: - to each object constant $c_i$ – a member $#[int]_J (c_i)$ of the domain $D_J$ [contstant corresponds to an object from domain]; - to each function constant $f_i$ – a function $#[int]_J (f_i)$ from $D_J times dots times D_J$ into $D_J$ [], - to each predicate constant $p_i$ – a predicate $#[int]_J (p_i)$ on $D_J$. Having an interpretation $J$ of the language $L$, we can define the notion of *true formulas* (more precisely − the notion of formulas that are true under the interpretation $J$). *Example.* The above interpretation of the “language about people” put in the terms of the general definition: + $D = {#[br], #[jo], #[pa], #[pe]}$. + $#[int]_J (#[Britney])=#[br], #[int]_J (#[John])=#[jo], #[int]_J (#[Paris])=#[pa], #[int]_J (#[Peter])=#[pe]$. + $#[int]_J (#[Male]) = {#[jo], #[pe]}; #[int]_J (#[Female]) = {#[br], #[pa]}$. + $#[int]_J (#[Mother]) = {(#[pa], #[br]), (#[pa], #[jo])}; #[int]_J (#[Father]) = {(#[pe], #[jo]), (#[pe], #[br])}$. + $#[int]_J (#[Married]) = {(#[pa], #[pe]), (#[pe], #[pa])}$. + $#[int]_J (=) = {(#[br], #[br]), (#[jo], #[jo]), (#[pa], #[pa]), (#[pe], #[pe])}$. === Interpretations of languages − the standard common part Finally, we define the notion of *true formulas* of the language $L$ under the interpretation $J$ (of course, for a fixed combination of values of their free variables – if any): + Truth-values of the formulas: $¬B , B∧C , B∨C , B →C$ [those are not examples] must be computed. This is done with the truth-values of $B$ and $C$ by using the well-known classical truth tables (see Section 4.2). + The formula $∀x B$ is true under $J$ if and only if $B(c)$ is true under $J$ for all members $c$ of the domain $D_J$. + The formula $∃x B$ is true under $J$ if and only if there is a member c of the domain $D_J$ such that $B(c)$ is true under $J$. *Example.* In first order arithmetic, the formula $ y((x= y+ y)∨( x=y+ y+1)) $ is intended to say that "x is even or odd". Under the standard interpretation S of arithmetic, this formula is true for all values of its free variable x. Similarly, $∀x ∀y(x+ y=y+x)$ is a closed formula that is true under this interpretation. The notion “a closed formula F is true under the interpretation J” is now precisely defined. *Important − non-constructivity!* It may seem that, under an interpretation, any closed formula is "either true or false". However, note that, for an infinite domain DJ, the notion of "true formulas under J" is extremely non- constructive. === Example of building of an interpretation In Section 1.2, in our "language about people" we used four names of people (Britney, John, Paris, Peter) as object constants and the following predicate constants: + $#[Male] (x)$ − means "x is a male person"; + $#[Female] (x)$ − means "x is a female person"; + $#[Mother] (x, y)$ − means "x is mother of y"; + $#[Father] (x, y)$ − means "x is father of y"; + $#[Married] (x, y)$ − means "x and y are married"; + $x=y$ − means "x and y are the same person". Now, let us consider the following interpretation of the language – a specific “small four person world”: The domain of interpretation – and the range of variables – is: $D = {#[br], #[jo], #[pa], #[pe]}$ (no people, four character strings only!). Interpretations of predicate constants are defined by the following truth tables: #table( columns: 3, [x], [Male(x)], [Female(x)], [br], [false], [true], [jo], [true], [false], [pa], [false], [true], [pe], [true], [false], ) #table( columns: 6, [x], [y], [Father(x,y)], [Mother(x,y)], [Married(x,y)], [x=y], [br], [br], [false], [false], [false], [true], [br], [jo], [false], [false], [false], [false], [br], [pa], [false], [false], [false], [false], [br], [pe], [false], [false], [false], [false], [jo], [br], [false], [false], [false], [false], [jo], [jo], [false], [false], [false], [true], [jo], [pa], [false], [false], [false], [false], [jo], [pe], [false], [false], [false], [false], [pa], [br], [false], [true], [false], [false], [pa], [jo], [false], [true], [false], [false], [pa], [pa], [false], [false], [false], [true], [pa], [pe], [false], [false], [true], [false], [pe], [br], [true], [false], [false], [false], [pe], [jo], [true], [false], [false], [false], [pe], [pa], [false], [false], [true], [false], [pe], [pe], [false], [false], [false], [true], ) == Three kinds of formulas If one explores some formula F of the language L under various interpretations, then three situations are possible: + $F$ is true in all interpretations of the language $L$. Formulas of this kind are called *logically valid formulas* (LVF, Latv. *LVD*). + $F$ is true in some interpretations of $L$, and false − in some other interpretations of $L$. + F is false in all interpretations of L Formulas of this kind are called *unsatisfiable formulas* (Latv. *neizpildāmas funkcijas*). Formulas that are "not unsatisfiable" (formulas of classes (a) and (b)) are called, of course, satisfiable formulas: a formula is satisfiable, if it is true in at least one interpretation [*satisfiable functions* (Latv. *izpildāmas funkcijas*)]. === Prooving an F is LVF (Latv. LVD) First, we should learn to prove that some formula is (if really is!) logically valid. Easiest way to do it by reasoning from the opposite: suppose that exists such interpretation J, where formula is false, and derive a contradiction from this. Then this will mean that formula is true in all interpretations, and so logically valid. Check pages 125-126 of the book for example of such proof (there is proven that axiom L12 is true in all interpretations). Definitely check it, because in such way you will need to solve tasks in homeworks and tests. === Prooving an F is satisfiable but NOT LVF == Gödel's Completeness Theorem *Theorem 4.3.1.* In classical predicate logic $[L_1−L_15,#[MP],#[Gen]]$ all logically valid formulas can be derived. *Theorem 4.3.3.* All formulas that can be derived in classical predicate logic $[L_1−L_15,#[MP],#[Gen]]$ are logically valid. In this logic it is not possible to derive contradictions, it is consistent.